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ABSTRACT 
Switzerland has for a long time been an important centre of banking services in Europe and 
beyond. Consequently, the banking sector has become important to Switzerland’s 
prosperity. This paper focuses on a central reason behind the success of the Swiss banking 
sector: the institution of banking secrecy, deeply enshrined in the Swiss history and 
tradition. The rapid development of international markets that eventually gave rise to a 
“group structuration process” has, however, progressively eroded Swiss banking secrecy. It 
has had to bend before the duty of transparency within the groups in order not to promote 
financial criminality through accelerated asset inflows.  Switzerland has also had to develop 
a comprehensive legislative frame to tackle financial criminality, and to enter into 
international agreements providing for mutual assistance. This process has undoubtedly and 
irremediably weakened the Swiss banking secrecy. Most importantly, nevertheless, the 
questionable ethical and socio-economic grounds of this controversial institution could and 
should also start to erode it from within.  
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1 INTRODUCTION - THE DEVELOPMENT OF SWISS BANKING SECRECY1  
Banking secrecy, broadly speaking, consists of keeping information concerning bank clients 
out of the reach of third parties, whether they are private or governmental.2 The 
institution is based on the assumption that everyone is entitled to the right to secrecy, 
which implies protection from any external interference, as well as any interference by the 
holder of any given information.3  
Switzerland has for a long time been an important centre of banking services in Europe and 
beyond.  Banking secrecy is part of Switzerland’s tradition, and is strongly protected by 
specific legal provisions whose amendment would require the approval of the Swiss 
Parliament and - as it is one of Switzerland’s traditions - most probably of the population, 
by means of a referendum.4 However, this institution has considerably faded during the 20th 
century.   
This contribution aims to determine first, why banking secrecy developed so successfully in 
Switzerland and, second, why it has lately progressively eroded.   
1.1 The Swiss banking secrecy tradition 
In most European countries, the creation of a modern, investment-based banking system 
started after the industrial revolution.5 Since the Swiss industrial sector was less developed 
and the few Swiss manufacturers that existed self-financed their activities, Switzerland was 
not party to this initial evolution. The synergies between industries and banks developed 
much later6 and the emergence of Switzerland as an international financial market place 
only occurred in the 20th century. Consequently, Swiss banking activity originally focused on 
savings, mortgage practice and portfolio management.7 In these sectors of private banking, 
confidentiality happened to be essential;8 herein lies the origin of the Swiss banking 
secrecy tradition.9 
                                                
1  The author would like to thank Servaas van Thiel for having prompted this contribution and shown 
continuous support to its achievement. 
2  Swiss law does not provide any statutory definition of banking secrecy. Thus, this paper refers to 
the doctrine that summarises the characteristics of this institution suggested by the different legal 
materials dealing directly or indirectly with the matter, such as Farhat (1970); Baudart (1977); 
Campbell (1992, 663); Aubert and others (1996, 995); Briscoe (1999, 302); Lombardini (2002); and 
Besson (2004, 5). 
3  It should be underlined here that such a concept could only arise in democratic States as 
democracy is a sine qua non condition to any kind of privacy protection. Banking secrecy and 
democracy are therefore intimately linked. On this topic, see Zondervan (1973).  
4  De Watteville 2002, 2. 
5  Rappo 2002, 17. 
6  Ibid., 18. 
7 Importantly, the French banks Pereire and Rotschild invested in the building of the Swiss railway, 
not a Swiss group (Erb 2002, 45; Rappo 2002, 19; Besson 2004, 38). 
8 Besson 2004, 21. 
9 Rules of confidentiality actually date back to the civil codes of the Middle Age. Thereafter, during 
the 16th and 17th centuries, Protestant bankers that had taken shelter in Switzerland fostered the 
duty of discretion, especially towards their peers who had remained in the catholic France and Italy 
(Campbell 1992, 663; Besson 2004, 21). 
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1.2 Regulating secrecy in Switzerland’s emerging international banking 
market  
Before the First World War, even though Switzerland only had a subsidiary place in the 
banking world, it started to attract foreign investors from all over Europe. The Swiss 
tradition of discretion was an important reason for the interest. The investments allowed 
Switzerland to take advantage of the rising taxes elsewhere across the continent. Banking 
secrecy was at that moment based on tradition and civil law provisions.10 
After the First World War, a deep depression shattered Europe’s economies. This prompted 
European governments to regulate their banking sector and to prohibit their citizens from 
trading in foreign currency. In spite of this, accounts were opened in Switzerland by 
citizens from all over the world. Indeed, as Switzerland had remained the continent’s only 
free trade zone in gold and currencies, and the only country immune to decrease in 
currency, wars and revolutions, it eventually came to be considered as the safest place to 
deposit assets. Consequently, between 1913 and 1939, Swiss banks grew considerably, and 
rivalled already the biggest French and German banks.11 
Switzerland had thus acquired an international reputation;12 in order to maintain it, it was 
forced to establish indisputable rules that would formalise the strong banking secrecy 
policy. Nowadays, many authors consider that the increasing French and German tax 
enquiries on their citizens’ Swiss accounts were the main arguments for the Swiss 
government to adopt criminal rules that sanctioned breaches of banking secrecy.13 These 
enquiries indeed have troubled the consciousness of the Swiss public, who consider them a 
violation of privacy, which Switzerland has always tried to protect. Accordingly, a broad 
debate ensued in this economically liberal country on how to protect banking secrecy in the 
most efficient way. Swiss leaders eventually came to the conclusion that in order to defend 
its liberal economic convictions, Switzerland had to rely on an indisputable and 
unambiguous criminal act on banking secrecy, not solely on tradition and on civil law.  
At the same time, Switzerland was urged to act in the field of banks supervision, as the 
global monetary crisis of 1929 had just been followed by the bankruptcy of one of the 
biggest Swiss banks14 in 1931. As a matter of fact, since Switzerland has a long and strong 
liberal economic history, economic regulation was, for a long time, at an embryonic state. 
No surveillance of banks had ever been established when the monetary crisis and the 
ensuing general withdrawal of assets occurred.15 A regulation was therefore a necessity. 
However, despite general support for a better control of the banking field, the whole 
financial sector and many politicians insisted on the necessity of preserving banking secrecy 
against all tax authorities.  
These two divergent positions were eventually reconciled by the adoption of the Federal 
Act on Banks and Saving Banks of 8th November 1934 (the "1934 Act"). The 1934 Act 
encompasses rules concerning the supervision of banks. It also provides that banking 
secrecy, which already existed as a civil and customary obligation, becomes an obligation 
sanctioned by criminal law. By introducing banking secrecy infringements in the criminal 
                                                
10 de Garidel-Thoron 2002, 24; Guex 1999. 
11 Besson 2004, 25 
12 Rappo 2002, 19. 
13 Salminen 1988, 10; Rappo 2002, 22; Eggli 2003. See also Hug (2000, 12) and  Besson (2004, 26). 
14 Banque de Genève. 
15 Briscoe 1999, 162. 
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sphere, the Federal Parliament explicitly reinforced the protection already granted to bank 
clients.16 Consequently, Switzerland became the country where banking secrecy was the 
best protected. This naturally led to a further in the volume of transfers to Swiss Banks.17  
A politico-historical element is often brought forth to explain the criminalisation of banking 
secrecy breaches: the Nazi pressure upon the Swiss banking establishment. Indeed, the 
banking industry often claims that the strong legal provisions on banking secrecy originate 
from the pre-war period, during which Hitler assigned a death penalty to German citizens 
who owned assets abroad.18 Three Germans were executed as a result of Gestapo-led 
espionage missions into Switzerland.19 According to some authors, these missions convinced 
the Swiss government to reinforce its banking secrecy provisions. Violations of banking 
secrecy were condemned in order to claim neutrality and independence from the Third 
Reich.20 This explanation on the hardening banking secrecy regulation is nowadays harshly 
criticized.21 Modern doctrine cautiously deconstructs the whole theory on the protection 
against the Nazis as the origin and justification for the legislation. It is certain that the Act 
helped some to evade capture by the Nazi authorities. However, there was no evidence 
that Swiss bankers were  ever particularly sensitive to the situation of German savers. The 
banking secrecy should not, therefore, be seen as a moral caution.  
As was mentioned above, an informal institution of discretion grew in the Swiss banking 
sector in the late 19th century. Civil legislation was referred to as the basis for 
confidentiality in business relationships. Then, in the early 1930’s, a criminal provision was 
adopted to strengthen the obligation.22 Under positive Swiss law, banking secrecy is thus 
simultaneously protected by civil and criminal law.23 
 1.2.1 Civil law 
The civil law theory finds its basis in the substantial jurisprudence of the Federal Court and 
in article 28(1) of the Swiss Civil Code. Article 28(1) does not clearly establish banking 
secrecy, but provides that “Whoever suffers from an illegal offence (against his person) is 
entitled to ask a judge for relief against anyone joining in the offence”.24  
Another civil provision to consecrate banking secrecy is article 398 alinea 2 of the Code of 
Obligation. This Article provides rules relating to the contract of mandate. The rules are 
                                                
16 de Garidel-Thoron 2002, 24. 
17 Hug 2000, 12; Eggli 2003; Besson 2004, 26. 
18 de Garidel-Thoron 2002, 24. Hitler’s objective was to gather all “German” funds in German banks. 
This act later became the tool used by the Nazis to ground the Jewish spoliation. Furthermore, in July 
1933, an act providing the confiscation of all assets belonging to the enemies of the German State 
was also adopted (de Garidel-Thoron 2002, 24; Turk 2003, 157). 
19 The method of the Gestapo was the following: agents were sent to Switzerland with the mission to 
make a deposit on the account of suspected persons in all Swiss Banks. If the cashier would accept to 
credit the account, it was the proof that the suspect owned an account abroad. After that, the 
German government obtained mandates from those persons to repatriate money in favour of the 
German State, of course by pressuring them (Rappo 2002, 19). 
20 As the Nazis kept on tracking German assets on the Swiss territory, Swiss government adopted an 
Act on spying, eventually integrated in the penal code in 1937.  
21 Hug 2000.  See also Guex (2000, 237; 2002, 25), Montebourg (2000, 27), Eggli (2002) and Besson 
(2004, 25). 
22 Schwok 2002, 25. 
23 Economic or tax espionage by a foreign country’s authority also became an offence. 
24 Author’s translation. This provision refers to all aspects of the personal sphere, including the right 
to privacy. La place financière Suisse 2003, 10. 
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considered applicable by analogy in most banking relations.25 When this is not the case, 
however, the Federal Supreme Court has stated that a bank’s obligation to observe secrecy 
becomes a part of the contractual relationship through the principle of good faith, inherent 
in customary law.26 From the point of view of civil law, the duty of secrecy is therefore, 
regardless of the exact relationship between a bank and a client, an obligation that applies 
in all contractual and extra-contractual relations linked to banking activities.  
 1.2.2 Criminal law 
The Swiss Penal Code sanctions infringements of banking secrecy in two provisions, namely 
Articles 162 and 320, which deal with trade secrets, confidential business information and 
secrets obtained in the practice of employment.27  
The most important legal basis for the protection of banking secrecy lies, however, in the 
1934 Act,28 which was adopted in the particular context discussed above. With this Act, 
Switzerland has simultaneously created a bank surveillance system and strengthened 
banking secrecy by extending it to the sphere of criminal law.  
Article 47 of the 1934 Act is dedicated to banking secrecy. It specifically provides that: 
“1. Whosoever discloses a secret that has been entrusted to him or of 
which he has received knowledge in his capacity as an officer, employee, 
agent, liquidator or commissioner of a bank, as a representative of the 
Federal Banking commission or as an officer or employee of a recognised 
auditing firm, or whosoever attempts to induce somebody else to commit 
such a violation of professional secrecy, shall be punished with 
imprisonment up to six months or with a fine amounting to 50.000 [Swiss] 
franks. 2. If the act has been committed by negligence, the penalty shall 
consist of a fine of up to 30.000 [Swiss] francs. 3. The violation of 
professional secrecy remains punishable beyond the termination of the 
official or professional relationship, or the exercise of the profession.(…). 
It is worth repeating that the 1934 Act was adopted after the stock market crisis of 1929 
had triggered global economic malaise and had prompted most European countries to 
strictly regulate their banking sectors. At that time, Switzerland thus clearly distinguished 
itself from other European countries by providing a very liberal body of economic 
                                                
25 Le Centre d'Economie Bancaire 1971, 179. 
26 This affirmation was further developed by the court in 1932: "Bank secrecy is nothing than the right 
of each bank client to demand the strictest confidence from the bank in the business affairs with 
which it is entrusted; it is equally, and conversely, the bank's duty to keep completely quiet about 
these affairs. For the banker in particular, this duty is independent of the legal relationship between 
the banker and his or her client. Whether there is a written contract or not, violation of bank secrecy 
constitutes a wrongful act according to articles 41 et seq. of the labour code.” (Campbell 1996, 666). 
27 The first provides that “[a]ny person who has disclosed a trade secret, confidential business 
information that was meant to be kept secret by virtue of a legal or a contractual obligation, any 
person who has used this information to his or her benefit or to that of a third party, will be, on 
prosecution, punished by imprisonment or by fine”. The second provides that “1. Any person who has 
disclosed a secret entrusted to him or her as a representative of authority or a civil servant, or who 
has acquired knowledge by means of his or her practice or employment, will be punished by 
imprisonment or by fine. The disclosure remains punishable even when the practice or employment 
has terminated. 2. The disclosure will not be punishable if it was made with the written consent of a 
superior authority”. (Author’s translation). 
28 See supra. 
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legislation. Furthermore, the Swiss government has maintained the 1934 Act in force over 
the years in spite of general international opposition.29  
The Swiss population seems to support this radically liberal policy: in 1984, in the 
framework of a public referendum, 74% of the population voted in favour of the retention 
of banking secrecy.30 On 2 July 2003, the National Council even called for the inclusion of 
banking secrecy into the Swiss Constitution.31 This latter initiative is, however, mainly 
symbolic: banking secrecy is already guaranteed in law, and, as such, a constitutional 
provision would not offer a higher level of protection.32 
 
 
                                                
29 Farhat 1970, 46. 
30 Besson 2004, 111; Swiss Bankers Association in 2004, pt 4.6. 
31 Article 13 of the Constitution now provides that "Banking secrecy is guaranteed".  Between autumn 
2002 and January 2004, six cantons proposed cantonal initiatives that pursued the same objective. 
32 Swiss Bankers Association 2004, 4.6; Besson 2004, 111. 
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2 THE PROGRESSIVE FADING OF SWISS BANKING SECRECY  
When Switzerland adopted the 1934 Act, it made quite clear its intention to make banking 
secrecy a firmly established principle and anticipated service.33 However, during the 
second half of the Twentieth Century, the institution has progressively faded. An 
examination of the reasons for and the circumstances surrounding the erosion of the Swiss 
banking secrecy are somewhat surprising, however: the ethical and philosophical principles 
behind the inception of banking secrecy are in no way linked to its decline. As a matter of 
fact, history shows that in the last decades, banking secrecy has only been considered (and 
often tackled) from the viewpoint of its effects and consequences on criminality. It has not 
been perceived as a concept which in itself calls for a review. 
2.1 The unclaimed assets crisis34 
During the Second World War, Jews from across Europe had deposited their assets in Swiss 
banks in order to avoid Hitler seizing them. Indeed, banking secrecy, combined with Swiss 
neutrality, offered high protection.  
By the end of the war, many of the account holders had died and their money remained 
unclaimed.35 The Allied immediately encouraged Switzerland to look for assets that had 
been deposited by the victims of the Nazi genocide.36 In the name of banking secrecy, Swiss 
banks however disregarded this request and refused for decades to disclose the names of 
their clients,37 arguing that the problem of unclaimed assets would easily be solved when 
their owners would eventually come to claim them. For most of them, of course, that never 
happened.38 Ironically, the very protection originally afforded to Jewish savers was – and 
still is – put forward as an example by Swiss banking representatives to justify the 
institution of banking secrecy. 
In the 1990s, a public campaign took place that shed light on the friendly relations that 
Switzerland had had with the Third Reich.39 This forced Switzerland to take action. In May 
1996, the “Independent Committee of Eminent Persons” (ICEP) was given the mandate to 
investigate the specific issue of dormant accounts. Alongside the ICEP, a Commission, 
generally known as the Bergier Commission,40 was established in December 1996. The 
Commission was given an extremely broad mandate to investigate, from a historical and 
                                                
33 Perrenoud 2003, 113; de Garidel-Thoron 2002, 24. 
34 This issue must be distinguished from the argument which the Allied and Switzerland had on Nazi 
leaders’ acécounts and gold stolen from foreign National Banks. 
35 Bower 1997; Perrenoud and others 2002. 
36 In 1962, a Federal Decree was adopted to encourage banks in the same way, but there has been no 
follow-up to this initiative. 
37 Lebor 1997, 209. 
38 Levin and  Dornberg, 1999; Turk 2003, 163. See also U.S. Department of State (1997); Chargéraud 
(2001); Besson (2004, 34.)  
39 The setting up of the Committee followed a Memorandum of Understanding, concluded on the 2nd 
of May 1996 between the World Jewish Restitution Organization, the World Jewish Congress and the 
Swiss Bankers Association. (Junz 2003) 
40 The chairman of the Commission was Professor Jean-François Bergier from the Institute for History 
at ETH Zürich. 
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legal point of view, the volume and fate of assets moved to Switzerland before, during and 
immediately after the Second World War.41  
Both the ICEP and the Bergier Commission came to the same conclusion: “the recurrent 
theme that runs like a red thread through thousands of pages of analysis is the “business 
logic first attitude” of Swiss Banks.42 
In reaction, Swiss Banks eventually agreed to publish a list of accounts that had remained 
unclaimed since the beginning of the Second World War. The names of 1872 Jews that had 
opened accounts before 1945, but had not had contact with the bank for at least 10 years, 
went public, which allowed the account holders' heirs to claim the assets. Banks also 
promised to disclose the names of persons who were thought to have died during the 
Holocaust; they eventually identified 64 000 dormant accounts that might have contained 
assets of Jewish for which Swiss citizens were account trustees.  
In the course of this process, Switzerland has thus accepted foreign examination of some of 
the accounts held in its banks. This has been the most significant waiving of the Swiss 
banking secrecy hitherto. Moreover, this event has, on the one hand, demonstrated that 
banking secrecy is not to be considered as totally unconditional43 and, on the other hand, 
showed that the moral ground on which the Swiss government allegedly based its policy on 
banking secrecy, was pure fiction. It unfairly took many years for the families of account 
holders to recover funds their relatives had tried to hide from the Nazis’ confiscation.44 
Although these historical events have shown the limits of banking secrecy, they 
nevertheless remain an exception. Therefore, they are unlikely to cause a full dismantling 
of the secrecy provisions. 
2.2 The internationalisation and diversification of the Swiss banking sector 
Until the beginning of the 1970s, Switzerland’s economic development permitted Swiss 
banks to concentrate their activities on Swiss soil.45 
In the 1970s, the rapid growth of international financial markets proved an incentive for 
banks to establish themselves where their operations were taking place. In addition, the 
political and economic stabilisation of foreign markets persuaded banks to provide their 
services and reinforce their position abroad.46 This gave rise, in the mid 1970s, to a new 
economic phenomenon in the banking sector: multinationalisation or “group 
structuration”.47 Banks formed alliances to cope with the pressures of international 
competition.48  
                                                
41 24 other governments have set up national commissions to document and assess how this issue has 
been dealt with in their respective countries. Chargéraud 2001; Junz 2003; Besson 2004, 34. 
42 Junz 2003. 
43 Even though, on this occasion, very specific conditions governed its withdrawal. 
44 Guex 1999. 
45 Rappo 2002, 25; Besson 2004, 30.  
46 OCDE 1983. 
47 Haegler and Jeger 1993, 60; Frick and Honegger 1996, 50. 
48 Since 1987, the number of groups of banks has dramatically increased all over the world, but also in 
Switzerland (Rappo 2002, 26). According to the Swiss National Bank, 143 foreign banks were active in 
Switzerland in 2002. They managed more or less 20% of the total assets deposited in the country and, 
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Initially, these alliances only occurred through mergers. After a while, other sorts of groups 
formed: holding companies (that did not exercise any banking activities) started integrating 
banks into their groups. The strategy allowed them to make management savings, 
ameliorate global risk control and thereby support their international development.49 The 
groups were able to finance themselves through banks of their own, which has, in turn, 
contributed to their growth.50 
Although this evolution in financial structures has led to an economic blossoming, it 
appears to have been one of the reasons why banking secrecy has recently faded. Indeed, 
the international expansion of banks constitutes an inherent threat to the institution. 
Firstly, there is a conflict between the clients' rights to secrecy and the obligation of 
parent companies to strictly control their subsidiaries or branches.51 Secondly, banking 
secrecy cannot be enforced over an international banking area. States control banks in 
terms of risk, yet not all states acknowledge similar levels of banking secrecy. Accordingly, 
"transparency" may to a certain extent have blurred banking secrecy for international 
groups of banks.52  
The most critical issue has nonetheless been the development of group structures. A 
tightening of financial networks has indeed led to acceleration in the flows of assets, which 
in turn promotes financial criminality.53  And, in order to tackle financial criminality, the 
Swiss banking secrecy regulation was dramatically narrowed in scope during the 1990’s.54 
This is currently the main threat to Swiss banking secrecy. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
already at the end of the 1990’s, two thirds of the banks established in Geneva belonged to foreign 
groups (Helbing 1993, 92; Briscoe 1999, 162; Besson 2004, 43). 
49 Rappo 2002, 27. 
50 This mechanism also allows groups to remain discrete on the operations that they run abroad, 
because the transfer networks are located inside them. Some other groups have integrated banks in 
their structures, not only for this reason, but as a service they can offer to their clients. (Ibid.) 
51 Frick and Honegger 1996, 50. 
52 OCDE 1983; Frick and Honegger 1996, 55; Rappo 2002. 
53 Helbing 1993, 92. 
54 De Watteville 2002, 3; Besson 2004, 31. 
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3 CAN THE SWISS BANKING SECRECY SURVIVE WITHIN THE GLOBAL 
COOPERATION TO TACKLE FINANCIAL CRIME? 
Most Swiss financial institutions have lifted banking secrecy to the level of an absolute and 
unconditional principle without exceptions. Bankers’ associations invariably convey this 
strict position in their opinions on legislative proposals or in commentaries on case law.  
Nevertheless, with the globalisation of the world’s financial markets and the liberalisation 
of capital movements, Switzerland, when applying a strict banking secrecy policy, has 
become more than ever exposed to the risk of its financial institutions being misused by 
criminals.55 In this context, a strict banking secrecy policy can only be maintained if it is 
accompanied by measures designed to prevent such abuse.  
Switzerland fully recognises that such measures are a necessity. Yet the Swiss are also 
plainly conscious that their banking activity and code of secrecy remains one of the factors 
that determines their competitive position in the international markets. Indeed, in terms of 
employment, tax revenues and added values, the financial sector is a key element of Swiss 
economy.56 The Swiss banking has centrally contributed to the success.57  
But no financial market can be attractive if it does not offer full guarantees that its 
activities do not promote financial criminality.58 Switzerland has therefore committed itself 
to constructing a system where a reconciliation between tackling financial criminality and 
preserving its reputation as an international banking centre is possible.59
                                                
55 Pieth and Aiolfi 2003. 
56 Contributing – directly or indirectly – up to 12% of Swiss GDP, employing 6% of the active population 
and generating over 20% of collective tax revenues. In 2002, the Swiss Stock Exchange had the eighth 
largest market in terms of market capitalisation. Switzerland also has the world’s fifth largest bond 
market and accounts (UBS 2001; Eggli 2002; Guex 2002, 27; Erb 2004, 116). See also Rappo (2002, 
25). Switzerland actually has the lead in portfolio management business, as private banking 
represents more or less 80% of the banking activity. Half of the 80 % is dedicated to foreign assets 
management. Accordingly, 59% of tax income provided by the banking sector comes from portfolio 
management (Swiss Bankers Association 1996, 39). 
57 However, it is worth mentioning that the success of Switzerland is also based on other factors such 
as the political stability and neutrality, the geographical location at the centre of Europe, and the 
availability of numerous specialised services with a high level of expertise (Helbing 1993, 174; De 
Watteville 2002, 12). 
58 Besson 2004, 31. 
59 As we have seen, Switzerland’s market is open for banks and financial institutions from all over the 
world and it provides a system in which banks act both in commercial banking and investment banking 
businesses. Consequently, more than one third of banks that are located in Switzerland are foreign 
ones. However, all banking operations in Switzerland are subject to the Swiss Federal Act on Banks 
and Savings institutions of 8 November 1934. This act has a very large scope as it applies to all 
business associations engaged in the banking business. In 1997, a Federal Ordinance with respect to 
foreign banks came into effect. The Ordinance clearly stated that any foreign bank that is effectively 
managed in or from Switzerland is considered to be a domestic bank, and is therefore subject to all 
relevant Swiss banking provisions (Briscoe 1999, 161-2). 
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3.1 Tax fraud 
International transfers of capital and capital market globalisation in general have 
dramatically expanded in the 1990’s.60 Along with this exponential development have come 
new challenges and risks, such as tax evasion. Swiss banking secrecy has regularly been 
criticised as a means to promote this type of criminality.61 The confidentiality of 
undeclared funds is indeed one of the key advantages of the Swiss banking area.62 
Moreover, Switzerland has always applied a rather restrictive definition of tax fraud: under 
Swiss law, the simple “dissimulation of taxable assets” does not fit under the definition, 
only collateral frauds (like the falsification of documents).63 Given these two elements of 
confidentiality and restrictive tax laws, Switzerland is a key target for tax related 
criminality, especially in the portfolio management sector.64 Switzerland’s participation in 
international prevention mechanisms is therefore a necessity.  
In order to avoid encouraging financial criminality, Switzerland has progressively adopted 
specific legislation or entered into international agreements providing for mutual 
cooperation. At the domestic level, the Swiss Federal Act on International Mutual 
Cooperation in Criminal Matters of 20 May 198165 entered into force in 1983. It intends to 
regulate all the procedures that relate to international cooperation in criminal matters. It 
however also provides that there it shall not allow information requests when they relate to 
acts that seem to diminish tax revenues or infringe monetary, economic or commercial 
policy measures (article 3 alinea 3).66 Tax evasion is therefore explicitly not addressed by 
it.67 
                                                
60 Helbing 1993, 152; Helleiner 1994; Germain 1997; Cerny 1998. 
61 Buzelay 2001, 667; Le Centre d'Économie Bancaire 1973, 12. It should be recalled here that in the 
introduction it was mentioned that the pressure of the Third Reich is traditionally presented as the 
historical background for the development of banking secrecy. Its original meaning, however, was tax 
evasion. 
62 There have also been other reasons for making Switzerland an attractive place for foreign assets 
since the end of the 19th century. In particular, most European states chose to impose a high tax 
burden from early on—also in the field of succession—while Switzerland offered, and still does offer, a 
very attractive tax regime.  
63 Lefèbvre 1997; Guex 2002, 25. Some cantons may even compete with some tropical tax havens 
thanks to the so-called “fixed-price practice”. Under this system, individuals who wish to get 
established in Switzerland are allowed to negotiate the amount of tax they will pay, via the 
intervention of a lawyer or a banker. Some other cantons offer advantages to companies with a very 
low tax rate. For instance, the canton of Zug offers a tax rate of 17 %, while Belgium’s rate is 33 % 
and Germany’s 39 %. 
64 Between 25 % and 35 % of the worldwide offshore private wealth (the one that is not managed in 
the country of origin of their owner) is managed in Switzerland; this gives Switzerland the top ranking 
in the sector. 
65 This law allows Switzerland to grant judicial assistance to states with which Switzerland has not 
concluded a bilateral agreement and which are not parties to the European Convention. 
66 Aubert and others 1995, 449; Aubert 1996, 111. 
67 This Federal Act, however, provides exceptions to the general refusal to cooperation. Examples 
include situations where the proceeding intends to discharge a person (article 63, al 5); or certain tax 
fraud matters that involve a crime (article 3 al. 3 in fine). In practice, it seems that these exceptions, 
nevertheless, have quite a restrictive scope. For the judicial cooperation be granted, the constitutive 
elements of fraud in tax matters must be obvious from the facts. On that point, the Federal Tribunal 
has adopted a rather strict definition so that the requesting state must actually disclose serious 
evidence of tax fraud and, to this effect, deliver a copy of any falsified documents, which are much 
closer to evidence than a mere suspicion. It may be added that amendments to the Act on 
International Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, which took effect on 1 February 1997, have eased 
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At the international level, the Swiss-American Treaty on Judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters provides that a judge will be entitled to discharge a witness from his or her duty of 
confidentiality if a request in that sense has been lodged within the framework of the 
prosecution of a common crime.68 However, since legal assistance will be refused if the 
proceedings are related to political, fiscal or military matters, the Treaty's efficiency is 
strongly limited.69 Furthermore, the Treaty also provides that all testimonies, declarations, 
or other evidence obtained by the requesting state on the basis of the Treaty cannot be 
used in a procedure, other than the one for which judicial cooperation was established. 
Accordingly, a person cannot be pursued for tax fraud on the basis of information collected 
in the course of another proceeding via the Treaty. 
Nevertheless, article 7 of the same Treaty provides that for proceedings in the field 
taxation of natural persons, judicial cooperation will be granted if the enquiring state 
considers it necessary in order to assure the prosecution of people affiliated to a criminal 
organisation or if, in the absence of cooperation, obtaining such information would 
constitute an excessive charge for the enquiring state. With these provisions, the 
inviolability of Swiss banking secrecy may thus be compromised in extremely rare 
situations.70 
At the present, the Swiss regulation aiming at tackling tax fraud is thus not likely to cause a 
dismantling of Swiss banking secrecy. This might, however, be subject to change in the 
near future (see Chapter 5). 
3.2 Money laundering 
Money laundering may be defined as “any act or attempted act to conceal or disguise the 
identity of illegally obtained proceeds so that they appear to have originated from 
legitimate sources”.71 Such activities not only hinder global security, but also compromise 
                                                                                                                                      
the process of assistance noticeably. In particular, they have clearly shortened the procedures 
involved by limiting the possibilities of appeal and by reducing the number of persons permitted to 
resort to these means to those personally and directly affected by the mutual assistance measure. 
The revised Act also permits, under certain conditions, the Swiss criminal prosecution authorities to 
transfer information and evidence to a foreign penal authority on their own initiative. Moreover, it 
has enlarged the powers of the Swiss federal authorities to act directly when provisional measures 
must be taken, as well as in complex cases or in cases of special importance. 
68 Aubert 1996, 117-20. 
69 Article 2 of the European Convention on Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (Campbell 1996, 
691; Schwok 2002, 25). 
70 Rappo 2002, 34. It may be noted that the Swiss Federal Law on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal 
Matters came into force on the 1st of January 1983 and was adopted subsequent to the Federal Law of 
3 October 1975 regarding the Treaty between Switzerland and the USA on Mutual Legal Assistance in 
Criminal Matters. Both acts follow the principles of the existing European Conventions on Extradition 
and Mutual Legal Assistance. This federal Law was revised and its current version has been in force 
since 1 February 1997. Although cooperative procedures exist for the prosecution of alleged tax 
evaders, Switzerland has been criticised for sheltering people charged with tax crimes elsewhere. 
 Switzerland has participated in the setting up of international standards, including the 
International Monetary Fund’s and the World Bank’s assessment programs on the financial sector in 
2001 and 2002. These standards apply to tax fraud prevention, as well as to the suppression of other 
kinds of financial criminality such as money laundering and corruption (see the following section). 
Lastly, to date Switzerland has concluded 66 double taxation agreements. This cooperation in 
preventing tax fraud has convinced the Tax Affairs Committee of the OECD to withdraw Switzerland 
from its “black list” (Swiss Bankers Association 2004, 4.3; International Monetary Fund & World Bank. 
71 Working definition adopted by the Interpol General Assembly in 1995. See also Swiss Bankers 
Association Report (2001, 3), in which the banking association defines money laundering as the act of 
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the transparency and efficiency of financial systems, thereby undermining global economic 
stability.72 For obvious reasons, banking secrecy may be an obstacle to the prevention of 
money laundering. It is moreover presented as being a driving force for this kind of 
criminality.73  
Although Switzerland tries to preserve its banking secrecy, it has, in the last decades, 
taken important initiatives to curb money laundering through a cooperative approach. 
Among all the regulations that have been adopted in the financial sector at the end of the 
20th century, those concerning money laundering have in fact affected Swiss banking 
secrecy the most directly.74  
3.3 Legal provisions 
In 1977, banks in Switzerland were the first to conclude a “Code of conduct with regard to 
the exercise of Due Diligence”.75 Customer Due Diligence rules have their origins in 
prudential law and international risk management within financial institutions.76 They are 
founded on the premise that understanding the customer’s business and conducting a 
diligence check is the most effective way to minimise the risk of financial criminality. In 
the development of such rules, the Swiss experience was crucial.  
Under the Convention, bankers are obliged to identify the holders of all the accounts. As a 
consequence, even when accounts are listed by number, the identity of the holder may be 
retrieved.77 This provision has strongly influenced subsequent international texts, such as 
the Forty recommendations of the FATF (see infra).78  
However, banks were, initially, not under the obligation to ask for the name of the account 
holder when he/she was represented by an intermediate, so that circumvention remained 
possible. But in 1991, the Federal Bank Commission decided to oblige all financial agents, 
lawyers, notaries, and fiduciary or portfolio managers to indicate the name of their clients 
to banks.79  
Switzerland outlawed money laundering back in 1990.80 Under articles 305bis and 305ter of 
the Swiss Penal Code, active money laundering as well as lack of due diligence in handling 
money are curbed. However, all money coming from activities that are not qualified as 
                                                                                                                                      
“concealing the origins of money and releasing it unnoticed into legitimate business activities” (Pieth 
and Aiolfi 2003; Besson 2004, 69). 
72 World Bank.   
73 Briscoe 1999, 302. 
74 Pieth and Aiolfi 2003; Besson 2004, 69. 
75 The first version of the Convention dates back to 1977. It has been revised since then every 5 years. 
The sixth version of this Convention entered into force on 1 July 2003 and provides quite severe 
obligations on the identification of bank’s customers. See Swiss Bankers Association Press Release 
(2003). 
76 Pieth and Aiolfi 2003. 
77 Campbell 1996, 695; Eggli 2002; Erb 2002, 46. 
78 Pieth and Aiolfi 2003. 
79 Montebourg 2000, 52. This was an answer to the FATF requirements, expressed in July 1989. The 
Swiss Federal Banking Commission has enacted directives that are consolidated in an Ordinance  of 1 
July 2003, that establishes strict requirements of diligence. See Switzerland’s Federal banking 
Commission (1998).  
80 Articles 305bis and 305ter of the Swiss Penal code, according to which the supervisory authorities 
are required to inform the penal authorities if they are aware of violations of the penal provisions 
that are contained in the specific surveillance legislation or in the Penal Code.  
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crimes under Swiss law (like simple tax fraud) falls outside of its scope.81 In this respect, 
the law’s efficiency is limited. 
The Money Laundering Act of 10 October 1997 came into effect on 1 April 1998. It intends 
to prevent money laundering within the meaning of articles 305bis and 305ter of the Swiss 
Penal Code. The Money Laundering Act is based on the abovementioned agreement on the 
Swiss Banks’ Code of Conduct with regard to the Exercise of Due Diligence and the Swiss 
Federal Banking Commission guidelines on money laundering. It has provided major changes 
to the tracking of this kind of criminality. 
Firstly, the Swiss anti-money laundering policy nowadays covers not only all financial 
intermediaries, but also all payment services which are executed without the involvement 
of a bank (this latter part addressing financial intermediaries from the non-banking sector). 
It contains a broad definition of financial activities considered to be particularly vulnerable 
to money laundering and it specifies the exact duties of the banking sector as well as of 
financial intermediaries. Secondly, the surveillance of the regulation has been entrusted to 
a specific control authority: the Money Laundering Reporting Office, to which all suspicious 
transactions must be reported without delay. All assets in relation to suspicious 
transactions will be frozen.82 In order to ensure the full implementation of the Act, bankers 
or financial agents who act with the required care and in good faith will not, in any case, 
be pursued for violation of professional secrecy or for contract infringement when giving 
such reports.  
The Swiss Federal Banking Commission monitors the compliance of all intermediaries under 
its supervision under the Money Laundering Act. The same applies to the Federal Office of 
Private Insurance with respect to insurance companies. Furthermore, the Money Laundering 
Act requires that all financial intermediaries be authorised. This enables authorised self-
regulatory organisations to implement measures to combat money laundering in their sector 
of activity. Such organisations must themselves be authorised and are supervised by the 
Money Laundering Control Authority, which is integrated in the Federal Finance 
Administration. In addition, the Banking Commission is responsible for directly monitoring 
compliance with the obligations laid down in chapter 2 of the Money Laundering Act for 
legal and natural persons who are not subject to any other federal supervision.83  
Taking into account that the Money Laundering Act is one of the most comprehensive 
pieces of regulation in this matter,84 it is noteworthy that the Swiss Money Laundering 
reporting office has received a particularly small number of declarations since its creation 
in 1998. There is even a downward trend in the number of communications made. In 2004, 
there were 821, down from 863 in 2003.85 Swiss authorities explain the results by the fact 
                                                
81 In most countries, money that is obtained through tax evasion and injected into the market is 
usually considered as laundered money (Montebourg 2000, 50; Besson 2004, 33). 
82 Article 10 alinea 3 of the MLA. 
83 In 2000, a commission of experts launched the idea to create an integrated surveillance authority, 
different from the one already existing within the Federal Finance Administration. It was aimed at 
exercising the tasks of the Federal Banking Commission and of the Federal Office of Private Insurance 
by gathering all surveillance activities within a single authority. After consulting the concerned 
partners, a second expert commission was designated to transpose this recommendation into Swiss 
legislation. As with all new legislation, it is no easy task when negotiations are ongoing (Schaerer 
2005, 11). 
84 Eggli 2002. 
85 MROS 2004, 7. It may be noted that the figures for 2003 were already themselves surprisingly low as 
regards the number of banks located in Switzerland. 
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that only serious hints lead to communications.86 Since only 544 condemnations for money 
laundering for 562 discharges were sentenced upon declaration between 1 April 1998 and 
31 December 2004,87 this statement is quite doubtful. 
Some months after the Money Laundering Act was adopted, the FATF stated that 
“Switzerland’s central geographical location, its relative political, social 
and monetary stability, the current context of liberalisation and the 
professional secrecy that characterises the country’s financial system are 
attractive to all investors, whether the origins of their funds is legal or 
illegal. In addition, advances in technology and a great diversity of 
institutions in the financial centre, exposes Switzerland to being used in 
international money laundering schemes. In this context, Switzerland is 
used primarily, but not exclusively, at the “layering stage of the money 
laundering process”.88  
Consequently, the Swiss government conferred to the Finance Federal Department the task 
of creating a working group and adapting the abovementioned Money Laundering Act 
accordingly.89 The project to amend this text has been submitted to the consultation of 
most “cantons”, judicial institutions, academic institutions and associations which all 
responded favourably. The project has thus been amended on the basis of these 
recommendations. The government has decided to postpone the follow-up report, because 
a third evaluation of Switzerland is being carried out by the FATF.  
Finally, many other international initiatives, in which Switzerland took part, have been 
launched in order to tackle money laundering since the 1980's. Examples include the 
Council of Europe’s recommendation on measures against the transfer and the safekeeping 
of funds of criminal origin90 (1980); the UN Convention Against Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (The Vienna Convention) (1988); and, the OECD 
Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, 
(1990).91 All of these provide rules and guidelines that are summarised in the 40 
recommendations of the FATF.92 
 
                                                
86 Montebourg 2000, 63. 
87 MROS 2004, 57. In September 2003, the Attorney-General of Geneva Daniel Zappelli recalled that in 
twelve years, only 30 out of 896 proceedings brought in Geneva for money laundering had lead to 
condemnation, mostly under the form of penalties. Of the 45 enquiries opened in Zurich between 
1998 and 2001, none were followed up (Besson 2004, 72).  
88 FATF 1999, 43.  
89 2003. 
90 Recommendation No. R (80) 10 of Council of Europe. 
91 This list is not exhaustive. 
92 One can also mention 1) the Basle Committee on Banking control that was founded in 1974 by the 
central governors of the G10. In 2001, it has adopted a set of minimum standards for the 
identification of clients. Those are the latest standards in the field in question; 2) the International 
Monetary Fund which in 2001 extended its mandate by launching an action plan for the fight against 
money laundering and terrorism financing (see infra); 3) the Wolfsberg Group, created in 2002 and 
encompassing some of the biggest banking institutions whose task is to establish, at the global level, 
directives on the fight against money laundering in the private banking sector; 4) the United Nations 
conventions and the Security council resolution that form the basis of the public international battle 
against terrorism financing (Convention for the suppression of the financing of terrorism – 1999 and 
the Convention against transnational organised crime - 2000); and 5) the Council of Europe, founded 
in 1949 that has devoted several conventions to the fight against money laundering and criminality as 
well as to international cooperation. 
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3.4 The efficiency and effects of the Swiss regulation on financial criminality  
Switzerland's strong will to maintain banking secrecy may be questionable. However, as far 
as prevention of criminality is concerned, one must note that it was a pioneer and remains 
one of the most regulated states, mainly in the field of money laundering.93 International 
organisations evaluating the quality of countries' banking surveillance and the level of 
cooperation with international organisations such as the FATF even acknowledge that 
Switzerland has undertaken some of the most stringent measures in that field.94 
Indeed, Switzerland was the first, in 1977, to introduce rules on the identification of clients 
in the framework of the Diligence Convention, which eventually inspired the FATF to issue 
its 40 recommendations.95 From the viewpoint of the revolutionary Swiss duty to “know 
your customer”, despite banking secrecy, nothing is secret anymore between Swiss banks 
and their client.96  
Another example is that the Money Laundering Act of 1998 has extended the application of 
anti-money laundering rules to all financial intermediaries, including lawyers, which is not 
the case in most other European countries or in the United States. Indeed, the United 
States and the United Kingdom have only imposed a duty of verification of client's identity 
after the 9/11 attacks, and this obligation is still less extensive than it is in Switzerland, as 
it does not concern American nationals.97 However, both the United States and the United 
Kingdom differ from Switzerland by the massive volume of transactions that banks declare 
to the competent authorities:98 more than 30 000 declarations were made in the United 
Kingdom, and more than 200 000 in the United States, which is far greater than in 
Switzerland.99  
The multiplication of normative instruments aimed at tackling money laundering is now to 
be considered as the main cause of the erosion of the Swiss banking secrecy, which has also 
weakened the attractiveness of Swiss banking. According to professionals, the number of 
clients that have fled to the Caribbean or the Anglo-Norman islands100 as a consequence of 
the measures to prevent this kind of criminality has dramatically increased over the last 
decades.101 Consequently, the Swiss banking practice seems to have evolved102 and the 
relations that Swiss banks now have with their foreign clients have changed. Traditionally, 
the clients would bring their assets into Switzerland, most of the time undeclared, and give 
bankers the liberty to manage and invest them. Nowadays, Swiss banks tend to establish 
themselves where their clients live.103 Pressures on the Swiss banking system with respect 
to the fight against money laundering indeed seem to have been so great that portfolio 
management and other private banking practices could have become easier outside 
                                                
93 Pieth and Aiolfi 1999, 302; Eggli 2002. 
94 Eggli 2002, 36. 
95 See supra. 
96 Pieth and Aiolfi 2003.  
97 Ibid.; Besson 2004, 81. 
98 Besson 2004, 81. 
99 Ibid.; Comptroller of the Currency Administrator of National Banks (OCC) 2000. 
100 Ibid., 78. 
101 This allegation remains difficult to assess. Overall, anti-money laundering measures are quite 
expensive for the banking sector. Indeed, their implementation implies that an internal "police" be 
set up, that workers be educated, and that computer surveillance systems be created – all at the 
expense of banks (Pieth and Aiolfi 2003). 
102 Besson 2004, 78. 
103 Ibid., 107. 
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Switzerland than inside it. In the short term, this tendency will, of course, not lead to an 
emptying of the Swiss financial market as Switzerland still represents an attractive place, 
thanks to its traditional advantages of discretion and guaranteed know-how.  
As far as tax evasion and tax fraud are concerned, things are different. Measures to tackle 
harmful tax competition and tax evasion could be a sensitive issue regarding banking 
secrecy. But, since the matter is particularly difficult to deal with, banking secrecy 
remains, so far, out of reach. The first obstacle to international cooperation in this field is 
the lack of mutual interest in global cooperation,104 the second that any cooperation in the 
field of taxation is highly sensitive to the non-participation of third countries as all efforts 
can be useless if assets are transferred out of the cooperative area.105 
Strong pressure from the international community persists anyway. As soon as demand to 
cooperate in the field of tax fraud had become unbearable, Switzerland had to harshly 
negotiate in order to counterbalance the negative effects of cooperation on its banking 
secrecy. Switzerland has, for instance, negotiated in the framework of a bilateral Tax 
Agreement with the European Union (EU) to exchange banking information, but rather to 
apply a withholding tax. This is a major arrangement for the future of the Swiss banking 
secrecy and it will be addressed in the following chapter.106 
 
                                                
104 Eggli 2002, 36. 
105 Ibid. 
106 The US is also an important actor in terms of tax cooperation pressure. However, its role will not 
be elaborated here. The focus is rather on the relations that Switzerland has with the EU.  
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4 BANKING SECRECY AND THE EU-SWITZERLAND RELATIONS IN TAXATION 
Switzerland is not a member of the EU, nor is it part of the European Economic Area (EEA). 
It is nevertheless geographically, culturally and economically very close to it, so that 
numerous bilateral agreements have been and are being negotiated between the EU and 
Switzerland in areas of common interests.107 The so-called Bilateral Agreements II, for 
example, were concluded in 2004 and deal inter alia with the fight against tax fraud. As far 
as banking secrecy is concerned, they are of particular concern. 
4.1 In the background - the European Savings Directive108 
The EU Directive on taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments (the 
“Savings Directive”) was adopted on 3 June 2003. With this directive, the EU intends to 
fully harmonise tax competition throughout the EU Member States and ensure a minimum 
taxation on the interests payments made to individuals resident within the EU. The 
directive requires either an exchange of information or the application of a withholding 
tax,109 where in the state, the savings income is uncontrolled. This is part of the internal 
evolution of the EU – namely the achievement of the common market and its corollary, the 
Monetary Union.  
The Savings Directive, which was initiated at the European Summit of Feira in 2000, covers 
savings income in the form of an interest payment from a paying agent established in a 
Member State to a beneficial owner, i.e. a natural person resident in another Member 
State.110 Therefore, it only affects individuals who are residents of one of the Member 
States and earn bank interest or other savings income on deposits or investments under a 
proper name in another Member State.111  
Initially, the idea was to impose an exchange of information between all Member States. 
But in Feira, three European countries that have a banking secrecy regulation – namely, 
Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg –insisted that such a measure should not be adopted if 
equivalent rules were not applied by several financial centres located outside the Union.112 
Those states feared that there would otherwise be loopholes that would jeopardise the 
whole system and favour the banking sectors of third countries.113  
                                                
107 Switzerland applied for EU membership in 1992. This application was directly linked with the 
negotiations for the conclusion of the Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA Agreement), 
which aimed at getting the EFTA nations closer to the EC. With the Swiss’ rejection of the EEA 
Agreement in a public referendum in 1992, the issue of EU membership was put on ice. A further 
referendum was held in March 2001, calling for an immediate start to negotiations on EU 
membership, but it lead to a resounding negative answer (77%). Nevertheless, in 2004 the Swiss 
Parliament decided to maintain the application for membership.    
108 Directive 2003/48/EC on taxation of savings income. 
109 Schwok and Levrat 2001, 335; de Limbourg and Borgeons 2003; KPMG 2003. 
110 Erb 2002, 47; Margelisch 2002, 22. These terms are defined in the Savings Directive.  
111 Docclo 2005. 
112 Namely with 5 “European Non Members”: Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino and 
Switzerland, as well as with 10 associated and dependent territories (Anguilla, Aruba, British Virgin 
Islands, Cayman Islands, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Turks and 
Caicos Islands). Bilateral Agreements have been concluded accordingly. 
113 Buzelay 2001, 665; Margelisch 2002, 23. 
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In 2003, the refusal of Switzerland to automatically exchange information on tax-related 
matters compelled the Union to find a compromise: Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg were 
authorised to preserve their banking secrecy as long as Switzerland114 would not accept 
information exchange standards as defined by the OECD. As a counteroffer, these three 
Member States were required to introduce a withholding tax of 15% in the first three years 
(from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2008), 20% in the next three years (from 1 July 2008 to 30 
June 2011), and 35% after 1 July 2011. With regard to the distribution of their withholding 
tax, the Savings Directive provides that these States will retain 25% of all receipts at their 
end and will transfer the remaining 75% to the Member State where the beneficiary owner 
is resident. Of course, the beneficiary’s home state will not receive any personal details of 
individual customers.115 
4.2 The Bilateral Agreements II 
The scope of the Savings Directive naturally only covers EU Member States. However, due 
to the proximity of Switzerland, discussions were rapidly started to apply the same or 
equivalent measures under a bilateral agreement. In the framework of these discussions, 
the Swiss banking secrecy was rapidly put to the forefront.  
An agreement that would have provided an automatic exchange of information within the 
framework of fully open cooperation between Switzerland and the EU would certainly have 
deprived Swiss banking secrecy of its meaning.116 Switzerland could not, however, simply 
refuse to cooperate with the Union. Switzerland was thus confronted with a dilemma. On 
the one hand, it would indubitably suffer grave economic consequences if the level of 
banking secrecy were to be diminished. On the other hand, should Switzerland not execute 
EU's requests, it would have to endure unprecedented pressure from the Union.  
Switzerland could not cope for long with the pressure imposed by the EU. Consequently, a 
set of specific agreements called Bilateral Agreements II was negotiated and eventually 
adopted on 19 May 2004. In these agreements, Switzerland aligned itself more or less with 
the Community regime, but managed nonetheless to preserve its banking secrecy.117 
The Bilateral Agreements II indeed provide measures equivalent to those applicable to 
Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg under the Savings Directive. Switzerland has thus become 
a collecting agent for the EU by withholding a minimum tax on all interest payments made 
by Swiss paying agents to individuals resident in a Member State.118 This is certainly a major 
step ahead. The withholding tax system is still an alternative that is albeit not as profitable 
as domestic traditional taxation. 
Switzerland has also agreed to exchange information, upon request, within the framework 
of an investigation on administrative, civil or criminal law grounds on tax fraud, or the like, 
under the laws of the requested state. The fraud must concern incomes specifically 
                                                
114 And other third states mentioned under footnote 112. 
115 Guide to the European Savings Tax directive, see 
www.irishpermanentintl.com/docs/EUSD%20Guide.pdf. 
116 de Garidel-Thoron 2002, 24. 
117 Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation providing for measures 
equivalent to those laid down in Council Directive 2003/48/EC on taxation of savings income in the 
form of interest payments (European Commission).  
118 As a counterpart, Switzerland has obtained measures equivalent to those laid down in the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive 90/435/EEC and the EU Interest and Royalty Directive 2003/49/EC. 
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covered by the Bilateral Agreements II.119 Any information so exchanged should be dealt 
with in accordance with double taxation agreements that are to be concluded between 
Switzerland and the relevant Member States.120 In this respect, Switzerland has agreed in a 
memorandum of understanding to enter into bilateral negotiations with each of the 
Member States. The agreements would provide for administrative assistance in the form of 
exchange of information in the cases mentioned above.121 There lies the weakness of the 
arrangement. As a matter of fact, since the term “tax fraud and the like” is to be 
interpreted under the laws of the requested state (i.e. the state where the funds reside), 
requests by a Member State will be denied by Switzerland whenever they relate to cases of 
tax evasion without collateral fraud. Indeed, as mentioned, simple tax evasion is under 
Swiss law merely an administrative offence; it will not give rise to cooperation under the 
Treaty dealing with offences.  
Another weakness is that only natural persons are covered by the arrangement:122 screen 
and off shore companies, or trustees from outside of Switzerland, may therefore be used to 
circumvent the rules.  
Regardless of its weaknesses, the adoption of the Bilateral Agreements II raises the 
question on Switzerland’s future room for manoeuvre in the field of combat against tax 
fraud. The Swiss certainly tried to avoid such an agreement.123 And we can expect the 
Union to apply pressure again, if other European regulations demand it. Such further 
regulation even seems inevitable, because the current deal with Switzerland does not 
efficiently prevent tax fraud.124 
The EU's regulatory process may thus, in many ways, exceed the boundaries of the 
European Union. Issues and problems that arise within the territory of the Union often 
become concerns for third countries, as the EU tries to avoid the negative consequences of 
its own regulative efforts. For that reason, Switzerland is in a particularly weak position: It 
is geographically located at the centre of the EU, but not member to it.  
                                                
119 Article 10 of the Agreement. 
120 Blum Attorneys at Law.  
121 Currently, Switzerland only grants administrative assistance to the extent that it is necessary for 
the application of a tax Treaty. It does not grant it solely for the application of the domestic law in 
another contracting state. 
122 In addition, it may be noted that an individual is not deemed to be a beneficial owner when he or 
she acts as a paying agent within the meaning of the EU-Swiss agreement, acts on behalf of a legal 
person, an investment fund or a comparable or equivalent body for investments in securities, or acts 
on behalf of another individual who is the beneficial owner and discloses to the paying agent his 
identity and state of residence. 
123 Schwok and Levrat 2001, 335; Margelisch 2002, 23. 
124 In this respect,  “European pressure” may already have played a role in the past: the Money 
Laundering Act can be perceived as a mere reaction to the EU Directive on money laundering rather 
than a voluntary, spontaneous action. The EU text, then again, was directly inspired by the FATF 
recommendations.  
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5 ERODING BANKING SECRECY FROM THE OUTSIDE—AND FROM WITHIN  
The financial sector (and banking more specifically) was crucial to Switzerland’s emergence 
as an international market place. A central reason behind Switzerland’s achievement is the 
high level of banking secrecy in the country. Indeed, the successes in the financial markets 
fed back into to further enhancements in the Swiss banking secrecy .  
Banking secrecy is commonly connected to financial criminality. Therefore, the financial 
sector became in the 1990's, after its complete liberalization, one of the most regulated 
services sectors. The rapid internationalisation of the sector and the formation of group 
structures together with the creation of new financial instruments and institutions have put 
banking secrecy into the centre of the discussions. Combating financial criminality is not 
feasible without an international cooperative approach, and transparency is required within 
the financial groups. Because Switzerland is an important actor in the sector, foreign states 
or institutions have put pressure on the Swiss to fully participate in the international 
cooperation mechanisms. The conclusion of the Bilateral Agreements II between the EU and 
Switzerland is a good example: the Agreements are a necessary complement to EU’s Savings 
Directive, and the Swiss had no other choice but to cooperate.  
Financial regulations and international agreements such as the Bilateral Agreements II, 
which provide for mutual assistance, have been central to the risk of erosion of the Swiss 
banking secrecy. Although the Swiss have so far managed to preserve their banking secrecy 
by not agreeing to automatically exchange banking information, international actors such 
as the EU have the means to force Switzerland to fully cooperate. They will certainly not 
hesitate to enforce compliance, either. Switzerland is therefore confronted with the 
difficult balancing act of preserving a tight banking secrecy regulation while not promoting 
international financial criminality. This process may be identified as the main threat to the 
survival of banking secrecy in Switzerland in the coming years. 
There is more to the issue, however. Indeed, while recent attacks on banking secrecy focus 
on the risks in terms of criminality, modern authors and politicians never seem to consider 
and assess the institution of banking secrecy as such. By focusing invariably on how the 
disguising of profits favours criminality one never arrives at discussing whether strict 
banking secrecy is defensible in a fair and democratic society to begin with. 
The reasons for the emergence of the banking secrecy tradition (and eventually legislation) 
in Switzerland, were initially ethical and philosophical, and based on historical grounds. 
Indeed, as was explained above, banking secrecy developed as a part of the long Swiss 
tradition of neutrality and individualism. It eventually became enforceable before criminal 
courts in the early 1930's, and was presented as a central element in the fight of the 
individual against the tendencies of states to hinder essential civil liberties. However, such 
justifications cannot be maintained anymore. Nowadays, governments that would prohibit 
their citizens from holding assets abroad could be opposed by simply refusing to cooperate 
with their countries in financial and other policies.  The refusal could be justified merely 
on the grounds of human rights and privacy, without having to rely on banking secrecy more 
specifically. Therefore, arguments based on human rights considerations should no longer 
be accepted in assessing the institution of banking secrecy.  
Marie Lamensch   25 
 
   
 
 
A closer look at the grounds of banking secrecy rather than its consequences reveals that 
keeping money safe from State control and interference is what this institution is about. 
Yet, surprisingly, no detailed assessment of what banking secrecy really is about - i.e. its 
intrinsic meaning and philosophical implications—has been made in the last decades. This 
means that while fortunate people enjoy the fundamental liberty of becoming and 
remaining rich, their ability to hide finances actually dismantles the very functioning of the 
state: they can avoid participating in the general financing mechanisms of the society. 
However, no society, not even the most liberal ones, can function without the basic 
fairness, equity and social solidarity that lie behind an effective and neutral taxation 
system. Therefore, besides the fact that a strict banking secrecy contributes to financial 
criminality, there are fundamental reasons to question the existence of the institution.  
So far, the main risk for Swiss banking secrecy has been external and indirect—the fight 
against international financial criminality. The erosion of the institution could—and should—
however also have an internal and direct reasoning: the secrecy’s inherent socio-economic 
unfairness. 
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